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Line managers and HRM: a managerial discretion perspective 
ABSTRACT 
Line managers play a central role in HRM practices, but research and theory on how 
their role is enacted remains underdeveloped.  This paper presents a case study of a large UK-
based fashion retailer, and uses managerial discretion theory to develop a novel 
understanding of line managers’ contribution to the implementation of HRM practices.  We 
describe three distinct ways in which line managers engage with HRM policies and 
procedures, and propose that line managers make an important contribution to the effective 
implementation of HRM systems through exerting their cognitive and political abilities to 
bring about decisions that are well suited to their local situations. Moreover, we find that HR 
specialists design and manage HRM policies and procedures to afford different levels of 
managerial discretion in different areas of HRM.   
Key words: Line managers, Human Resource Management, managerial discretion. 
INTRODUCTION 
In most organisations today, line managers play a central role in the implementation 
of HRM practices.  Whether interviewing candidates, conducting and communicating 
performance appraisals, proposing merit pay increases, or delivering on-the-job training and 
career advice, line managers are deeply involved in  shaping the outcomes of HRM practices 
for their team members and in delivering those outcomes to them (Wright and Nishii, 2013).  
Despite such a role being widely acknowledged in the literature, research and theory on how 
it is articulated remains underdeveloped (Beer et al., 2015).  This gap is important because 
any consideration of the effects of HRM needs to take into account actual practices as 
enacted by line managers and received by employees (Wright and Nishii, 2013).  
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This paper takes a new perspective on how line managers engage in HRM practices 
by applying managerial discretion theory (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987) to analyse data 
from a case study of a large retailer.  Managerial discretion scholars have examined how 
managers use their cognitive and political abilities to interact with contextual constraints and 
influence organisational outcomes.  At the middle manager levels, managerial discretion has 
been deemed necessary for effective strategy implementation, enabling managers to choose 
the course of action that is most appropriate to their local situation (Wangrow et al., 2015). 
The present research contributes to the HRM literature in two ways.  First, it seeks a 
fuller understanding of line managers’ role in the implementation of HRM practices.  
Researchers have often used expressions such as ‘bringing HRM practices to life’ to describe 
the role of line managers, but have provided little detail on what this might entail.  Moreover, 
existing research has described how line managers can detract from the effective 
implementation of HRM practices, due to a lack of diligence or skill, but much less is known 
about how line managers may contribute to effective HR implementation.  The present study 
seeks to address this gap by explicating how line managers contribute to the effective 
implementation of HRM practices. 
Second, this paper aims to provide a richer understanding of HRM decision making.  
HR devolution research, which has examined the allocation of HRM responsibilities between 
line managers and HR specialists, has concluded that the most common arrangement in 
contemporary organisations is for both to share responsibility for HRM decision making.  
Unfortunately, we know little detail about the arrangements behind such sharing of 
responsibilities.  The present study thus responds to recent calls for case-study research 
(Brewster et al., 2015) that investigates how line managers and HR specialists share 
responsibility for HRM decision making. 
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The paper is organised as follows.  First, there is a review of the HR devolution 
literature, followed by an introduction to managerial discretion theory. The methods used in 
the study are then described, followed by its main findings.  The paper concludes with a 
discussion section that develops a view of HRM implementation through a managerial 
discretion lens, and a conclusion where the study’s limitations and implications for research 
and practice are discussed. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In his early assessment of HRM adoption in the UK, Guest (1987) identified the 
transfer or ‘devolution’ of people management tasks from personnel specialists to line 
managers as one of the features that distinguished the emerging HRM approach from 
traditional personnel management.  A sizeable literature on ‘HR devolution’ has since 
examined the allocation of HRM tasks and responsibilities between HR specialists and line 
managers.   
A chief contribution to this literature has been provided by Brewster and colleagues’ 
analysis of data from successive waves of the ‘Cranet’ survey (Brewster and Larsen, 1992, 
Larsen and Brewster, 2003, Brewster et al., 2015).  Their research has examined the extent to 
which responsibility for areas of HRM policy is assigned to line managers or to HR 
specialists across firms in several, mainly European, countries.  Their main findings are 
fourfold.  First, there are significant differences between countries in the extent to which line 
managers are involved in HRM: Denmark and Switzerland are the countries where 
responsibilities are most devolved to line managers, whereas Italy and the UK are the least 
devolved (Brewster and Larsen, 1992).  Secondly, whereas some of the initial thrust for their 
research was to document a perceived trend for increasing assignment of HRM 
responsibilities to line managers, over subsequent waves of data, the authors found that the 
trend is weak, denoting “considerable stability” in line managers’ HRM responsibilities over 
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time (Larsen and Brewster, 2003:239).  Thirdly, the research found that in most cases 
responsibility is shared between HR specialists and line managers, rather than the sole 
responsibility of either of the two (Larsen and Brewster, 2003).  However, for some areas of 
HRM, greater responsibility tends to be assigned to line managers more often than for others.   
Thus, of five areas of HRM, Brewster et al. (2015) found that, across all countries, more than 
half the organisations gave line managers primary responsibility for workforce expansion or 
reduction, and for recruitment and selection, whereas fewer than one third did the same for 
industrial relations.  Fourthly and finally, only a small portion of the variation in 
organisations’ overall HR devolution score (R-squared of about 10%) can be explained by 
firm characteristics (size, industry, public/private status, union density) or differences in 
national institutional setting (liberal vs. coordinated market economy), leading the authors to 
suggest that firms have “substantial freedom” to set up distinct ad-hoc arrangements 
(Brewster et al., 2015). 
Further to these core findings, the literature has explored reasons and barriers for HR 
devolution.  At the heart of most discussions on reasons for HR devolution is the increasing 
awareness of the importance of employee behaviours and skills for the strategic success of 
organisations (Barney and Wright, 1998), which has led to two important pressures driving 
HR devolution.  First, organisations have increasingly given line managers responsibility for 
all aspects of the business unit they lead—including responsibility for HRM—in order to 
increase their accountability for the results obtained (Brewster and Larsen, 2000).  The 
associated assumption is that line managers who are in daily contact with employees, 
production processes and customers, are best placed to integrate HRM decisions with other 
aspects of day-to-day management in a way that maximises business unit performance.  
Second, HR departments have pursued, or been asked to pursue, a more ‘strategic’ role, 
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shedding administrative and routine activities in the face of pressures to reduce their size and 
overheads (Hall and Torrington, 1998).   
Alongside these pressures for HR devolution, researchers have identified several 
barriers that have limited the speed and scope of its adoption.  Chief among these is line 
managers’ failure to engage fully in their HRM duties, due to a lack of desire or ability, 
conflicting priorities, or time pressures (McGovern et al., 1997, Brewster and Larsen, 2000), 
especially since organisations do not always provide adequate structures to support line 
managers in their HRM activities, such as formal training or incentives (Teague and Roche, 
2012).   
Such lack of engagement by line managers can have negative implications for the 
effects of HRM systems.  Sikora et al. (2015) found positive workplace outcomes, such as 
lower intention to quit, higher job performance, and higher participation in decision making, 
among employees whose line managers made more frequent use of HRM practices.  
Moreover, as line managers with varying abilities and goals implement HRM policies, they 
introduce variation in the actual practices received by employees (Wright and Nishii, 2013).   
Such variation is problematic because any effects of HRM practices must be brought about 
by employees’ reactions to the actual practices they experience: at the individual level, line 
managers’ HRM actions “form and fulfil” employees’ psychological contracts (McDermott et 
al., 2013), while, at the group and organisational levels, consistency in the implementation of 
HRM systems underpins their ‘strength’ in creating organisational climates for performance 
behaviours (Bowen and Ostroff, 2004). 
Overall, the existing literature on HR devolution has provided strong findings on 
levels of line manager involvement in HRM across large samples of firms.   However, its 
heavy reliance on survey research has meant that it has had little opportunity to go beyond 
coarse measures of overall responsibility for HRM, to explore the details of how tasks and 
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responsibility are shared between HR and line managers (Brewster et al., 2015).  Some recent 
research has started to address this shortcoming. For instance, Jones and Saundry (2012) 
examined disciplinary procedures in several UK-based organisations and found that their 
nature and outcomes were shaped by the interactions between line managers and HR 
specialists.  Likewise, in a study of hospitals in Ireland, the UK and the Netherlands, 
McDermott et al. (2015) found a tripartite distribution of HRM responsibilities, involving line 
managers, HR specialists and senior professionals.  These studies suggest that arrangements 
between HR and the line may be more complex than has been shown in the literature.  The 
present study builds on this research by investigating the roles of HR specialists and line 
managers in HRM decision making at a retailer.   
MANAGERIAL DISCRETION 
Managerial discretion theory was developed by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) as a 
way to ‘bridge’ the contrasting views of organisational inertia and strategic choice.  It 
remains highly influential in the strategic management literature, particularly in research 
relating to CEO and top management team behaviour, executive compensation, and firm 
strategic behaviour (Wangrow et al., 2015).  Hambrick and Finkelstein defined managerial 
discretion as “latitude of managerial action” (1987:371), that is, the choice of actions 
managers have in pursuing organisational objectives.  They suggest that such latitude of 
actions is not totally determined by constraints present in the context, but also depends on the 
characteristics of the manager.  Contextual constraints are largely dependent on other 
stakeholders: they are often unstated, a “socio-political phenomenon” related to other 
stakeholders’ potentially negative response to managerial action.  Thus, managerial discretion 
is not an ‘absolute’ or ‘fixed’ concept, but can be shaped by the actions of the managers 
themselves.  Some managers are better able to “perceive, create and enact discretion” than 
others, that is, they are able to identify non-obvious courses of action and persuade other 
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stakeholders to support them.  In this view therefore, a manager’s discretion results from the 
interplay between contextual constraints and his or her own cognitive and political abilities. 
Shen and Cho (2005) usefully expanded the theory by combining Hambrick and 
Finkelstein’s (1987) insights with those of the agency theory literature (Eisenhardt, 1989).  In 
Economics, agency theory is used to model situations in which a principal contracts with an 
agent to perform some work, and explores the implications of differences in goals and 
attitude to risk between the two (Eisenhardt, 1989).  In this framework, managerial discretion 
describes the ability of managers to pursue goals different from those of shareholders, which 
can be curbed through the use of adequate monitoring and incentives (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  Shen and Cho (2005) integrate these ideas by proposing that managerial discretion 
has two components: latitude of objectives and latitude of actions.  Whereas latitude of 
actions refers to the same aspects described by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987), latitude of 
objectives refers to managers’ ability to choose what objectives to pursue.  Such ability can 
be limited through what Shen and Cho (2005) termed “performance pressure”, which 
depends on the vigilance of other stakeholders and the effectiveness of the monitoring and 
control mechanisms they put in place. 
Although most research stemming from managerial discretion theory has examined 
CEOs and other top executives of the firm, a small number of studies have successfully used 
the managerial discretion construct in explanations of managerial behaviour at functional and 
middle levels (Kuratko et al., 2005, Scott et al., 2009, Caza, 2011).  Indeed, a recent review 
of the managerial discretion literature concluded that discretion for middle managers is a 
requirement for effective implementation of strategy (Wangrow et al., 2015).  Our study 
therefore responds to recent calls for research on managerial discretion below the executive 
level (Wangrow et al., 2015) by investigating discretion in the implementation of HRM 
practices by first-line and mid-level managers.  
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METHODS 
This research follows an inductive case study approach, which is appropriate to 
develop theory about phenomena in the rich context in which they occur (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007).  The organisation studied is a large UK-based fashion retailer, with several 
hundred stores nationwide employing an average of close to 50,000 people, equivalent to 
around 25,000 full-time jobs.  A retail organisation was chosen because, as archetypal 
replicators (Winter and Szulanski, 2001), they combine geographical dispersion with a strong 
need for central control of store-based activities.  We therefore expected that this type of 
setting would be ideal to observe the dynamics of local adaptation and central control in 
HRM policy implementation.   
The company is a leader in the mass midmarket segment where it faces stiff 
competition from rival retailers.  At the time fieldwork took place (2010-2011), it was under 
increased competitive pressure due to the difficult situation in the broader economy in the 
aftermath of the 2008-9 recession, which had led to a sustained decline in like-for-like sales 
over several years.  In response to these challenges, management took several short-term 
cost-cutting measures, including lower inventory and lower staffing levels across its stores. 
Data collection 
Data was collected through semi-structured interviews with 44 managers in 13 stores, 
and a further 5 interviews with members of the divisional HR department at head office.  
Interviews with line managers were deliberately scheduled first in order to gather their 
perspective of HRM activities with minimal preconceptions.   
Two waves of interviews with line managers were carried out three months apart 
(n=21 and n=23, respectively).  For each of the two waves, an HR officer arranged for the 
researcher to visit a different set of 6 (wave 1) and 7 (wave 2) stores.  Stores were selected on 
the basis of their size (classed as medium to large) and location (within a 50-mile radius of 
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the researcher’s base).  Stores visited ranged from around GBP 2.5 million in annual revenues 
and 45 employees, to around GBP 15 million in annual revenues and more than 150 
employees.  On arrival at each store, the researcher first interviewed the Store Manager, and 
then selected up to three additional members of the management team among those that were 
available on the day of the visit.  On three occasions a repeat visit was necessary, as there 
were insufficient respondents available the first day.  Respondents’ job titles included Store 
Manager (12 respondents), Assistant Store Manager (9) and Sales Manager (16)1.  35 
respondents (80%) were female, and median length of service was 7 years, ranging from less 
than 1 year to 24.   
Line manager interviews lasted for about 40 minutes each on average, for a total of 
close to 30 hours of recorded material.  The semi-structured interviews included questions 
about areas of HRM where the respondent was involved (“What are the main HR activities 
you are involved in?”), about recent HRM decision processes (“Can you recall an HR process 
or decision in which you have recently participated?”), about their perceptions of the 
usefulness of HR policies (“Do you find company HR policies useful in managing your 
team?”), and about their interactions with the HR department (“Do you have access to an HR 
specialist?”). 
Four months after wave 2 interviews in the stores, the researcher interviewed 5 
members of the Retail HR department at head office.  The goal was to understand the role of 
the HR organisation and their interactions with line managers, crosscheck some emergent 
findings about line managers’ HR role, and clarify some areas of policy and practice where 
data from line manager interviews seemed fragmented or contradictory.  Respondents were 
selected to provide a range of views on HRM processes representative of the division’s HR 
                                                 
1 Other job titles were Commercial Manager (1), Operations Manager (1), Sunday Manager (1), Sales 
Supervisor (1), Office Manager (2), and Stockroom Supervisor (1). 
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department, and included the Head of Retail HR, two Regional HR Managers, and two HR 
Officers.  These interviews lasted around 1 hour each on average.    
In the last stage of data collection, internal documentation was gathered on the 
relevant HR policies.  Seven major policy documents were collected, including the Staff 
Handbook, Attendance at Work Guide, Disciplinary Guide for Managers, Store Structure and 
Salary Pack, Long Term Non-Attendance Guide and a specimen of the weekly Vacancy 
Bulletin, among other minor documents. 
Data analysis 
All interviews were transcribed verbatim and the transcripts incorporated onto an 
Nvivo database for inductive data analysis.  The researcher’s initial interest was in how HRM 
activities were carried out at the company and how individual HRM decisions—a hire, a 
promotion, a pay rise or a dismissal—were arrived at, and who made them: store-based line 
managers or head-office-based HR specialists. 
In the first stage of analysis, line-manager interview data was coded by the type of 
HRM activity, using respondent generated codes.  These codes were further refined by 
grouping activities that were closely related in line managers’ accounts.  This process led to 6 
major areas of HRM activities that affected the stores.  Using both generic accounts of 
activities and participant narratives of specific instances of HRM decision making, the 
researcher developed detailed descriptions of how decisions were made in each of these 
areas.  These descriptions were subsequently used to structure interviews with HR specialists, 
seeking to test their veracity, clarify ambiguous aspects, and fill in the parts of decision 
making processes that were not visible to line managers in the stores.  Finally, the content of 
policy documents was mapped to those HRM activities where it was relevant.  The resulting 
refined descriptions form the basis of the first part of the Findings section.  
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Attention then turned to describing the roles of line managers and HR specialists in 
narratives of actual HRM activities.  Data was coded to identify where each of them 
contributed to HRM decision making, and themes were developed for each.   For line 
managers, data was coded according to whether they were following or applying policy, or 
contravening it.  However, it became apparent that a third category was needed for those line 
manager activities that were simply not described or even foreseen in policy.  Moreover, 
narratives often included important contextual elements which had an impact on HRM 
decision making, particularly in relation to conflicting requirements or priorities in the 
running of the stores.  Such thematic analysis of narratives of actual HRM episodes led to the 
three latter subsections in the Findings below: performance pressure, role of HR department, 
and role of line managers.  
FINDINGS 
Our data revealed nuanced detail about HRM decision-making processes at the 
company.  This section describes four main findings.  First, the designs of HRM decision-
making processes varied in terms of their (de-)centralisation. Second, HRM decision-making 
processes were embedded in the broader set of activities required to run the store, so that 
performance pressures impacted on how HRM was carried out.  Third, the HR department 
was involved in HRM decision-making processes in diverse ways, and in some more than 
others.  Finally, line managers varied in their involvement and their impact on HRM 
decisions. 
HRM decision-making processes 
HRM decision-making processes varied greatly at the company.  Some processes 
were highly centralised, in the sense that decisions were taken at Head Office with little or no 
involvement by store-based managers, whereas others were decentralised, in the sense that 
line managers in the stores were deeply involved in them.  This was not a binary distinction, 
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but rather there was a range of arrangements.  At one end of the range, decisions on store 
structure were taken centrally at head office with very little input from store managers. At the 
other end, hiring for entry-level positions was undertaken locally by managers in each of the 
stores.  Other HRM processes combined elements of centralisation and decentralisation, so 
that decisions involved both head office and store-based managers to varying degrees.  In 
what follows we review the decision-making processes for the six areas of HRM that 
emerged from our data analysis as most relevant to the stores. Figure 1 provides a summary 
of the main findings. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Store structure.  Centralised definition of store structures was an important element 
in the way the company pursued net profitability of its stores through cost containment: “It's 
about maintaining control of what is potentially an area of the business that could run away 
and become very, very expensive if not careful.” (HRM5, Head of Retail HR).  Head office 
determined the management structure and staffing level for each store depending on a generic 
template for in-store processes, and the specific revenue targets and opening hours of the 
store.  The rationale was simple: “it's based on the turnover of the store, because turnover 
creates work, and work creates more heads to manage, and fundamentally the more heads 
you have to manage the more supervision you need” (HRM5, Head of Retail HR). Thus, the 
company defined revenue bands for stores and sales floors, and for each band specified the 
managerial positions to be filled, with their corresponding level, salary grade and contract 
hours.  Allowance was made for store particularities, such as extended trading hours, need for 
out-of-hours delivery or operation of an off-site warehouse.  Exceptions to the standard 
management structure produced through this template were rare: store managers could argue 
for small adjustments based on actual observed operational needs in the store, but these were 
carefully scrutinised by Head Office and only rarely approved. 
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For non-managerial staff, head office determined the total hours to be contracted for 
each store and an overall budget of ‘man-hours’ that the stores could manage based on a 
‘productivity formula’ that linked man-hours, customer footfall and sales revenue.  Most non-
managerial staff were on part-time contracts for a small number of hours, but would then be 
offered additional hours as deemed necessary by their store management.  In this way, the 
store was able to adjust its staffing levels according to anticipated peaks and troughs in 
footfall and revenue as affected by local conditions, such as weather or local events. 
Store structures and man-hour budgets were reviewed at least annually to take account 
of redesigned in-store processes or changes in the store’s revenue target.  Adjustments to the 
structure of a store could lead to the upgrade, downgrade or elimination of existing jobs, 
directly affecting the hours, pay or employment of incumbent employees. Achieving the 
required adjustments in store structure could involve hiring and promotions, as well as 
employee consultations.  Carrying out these procedures in an effective and timely manner 
was the responsibility of each store manager. 
Salary and bonus.  All employees’ salaries and bonuses were set centrally according 
to a set of salary scales that were fully disclosed to line managers at store-manager level and 
above.  The scales were reviewed annually to allow for cost-of-living increases.  Non-
managerial employees were paid hourly at the legal minimum wage, except a small minority 
who had been promoted to a slightly higher ‘merit rate’.  Managers’ salaries were determined 
by their ‘grade’ and ‘step’.  Each managerial position defined in the structure of a store was 
attached to a salary grade and each grade had four steps—developing, competent, experienced 
and excellent.  Newly appointed managers would normally be placed in the ‘developing’ step 
during a probationary period of 3 to 6 months, and move to ‘competent’ after an appraisal at 
the end of that period.  Higher steps were attained through merit increases.  In a promotion, 
when starting at the ‘developing’ step did not imply a suitable increase for the individual, 
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area managers could decide to grant a higher step, as long as the new step was lower than the 
one the employee had in their previous grade.  This meant that, in practice, an informal ‘one-
grade-up-one-step-back’ rule was applied in most promotions. 
Merit increases for both managers and non-managers were decided through an annual 
salary review process.  An overall increase was first approved by divisional management as a 
percentage of total payroll, and communicated to the stores.  Area managers then initiated 
discussions with their store managers to identify high-performing individuals, and put 
together a proposal for approval by their regional manager and a final sign off by the head of 
the division.  Due to the multiple revisions and budgetary assessments at different levels, the 
process tended to be quite restrictive, and only a small number of merit increases were 
approved each year. 
Bonuses were paid monthly and seasonally, based on attainment of store revenue 
goals.  Individual pay-outs, which could amount to as much as 15% of base salary for 
employees and 30% for managers, were calculated at Head Office according to each person’s 
salary grade and hours worked during the period.  For store managers, the final amount paid 
was adjusted according to the attainment of a few additional store goals, which could vary 
from season to season. 
Performance management.  Respondents used the term ‘performance management’ 
to refer to a range of activities aimed at encouraging some behaviours and discouraging 
others, including on-the-job supervision and guidance, informal verbal counselling, formal 
performance reviews, and disciplinary procedures leading to formal sanctions.  The most 
common, day-to-day performance-management activity consisted in direct supervision on the 
shop floor.  Sales managers were required to perform ‘floor walks’ every 30 minutes during 
their shift, in which they reviewed the standards of the floor and employees’ customer service 
behaviours.  When they spotted something amiss, they were instructed to ‘corrective-coach’ 
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the employee: “We are told corrective coaching is the best way, so just quickly as soon as 
you see something, nip it in the bud, go along and say: ‘Try it like this, it may work better’” 
(MGR12, Sales Manager). 
The next level of performance management was the formal review.  The manager 
called the employee to the office for a ‘counselling session’ and filled in a ‘record card’ 
describing a specific behaviour that needed to change, along with a set of actions and a time 
when performance would be reviewed again.  After the set time had elapsed, if the behaviour 
was corrected, the employee ‘came off’ formal review, otherwise a time for a new review 
was set.  After several formal sessions, if the behaviour persisted, the manager could decide 
to initiate a disciplinary process.   
A ‘disciplinary’ typically involved a hearing where the employee was presented with 
evidence of inappropriate behaviour, was given a chance to argue her case, and a decision 
was made regarding the imposition of a formal sanction on the employee.  Disciplinaries 
were carried out in the stores, usually chaired by store management, and were subject to 
formal requirements such as advance notice, presence of witnesses and note taking, as 
determined by employment law.  Possible outcomes of the hearing ranged from ‘no further 
action’, to inserting a note in the employee’s personnel record, giving a first written warning, 
a final written warning, and dismissal.  Before reaching a decision, the manager was 
instructed to adjourn the hearing and call HR for advice.  From the point of view of the HR 
department, this arrangement was a way of balancing the need for consistency in decisions 
with their limited ability to reach the stores: 
There are thousands of ER events a year in our stores.  We cannot be closely involved 
in every single event, we have to accept the judgement of the person at the end of the 
telephone and we have to accept they have done a proper investigation. (HRM5, Head 
of Retail HR) 
 
The employee behaviours that prompted performance management were varied.  
However, three types of issues were most frequently mentioned by respondents.  First, 
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employees were often performance-managed because of absence and lateness.  At the time of 
our research, the company had just implemented a new clock-in system, by which employees 
clocked in and out at the till at the start and end of their shift.  The system prompted 
managers to initiate performance management actions when trigger-points for absence or 
lateness were reached.  A second major reason for performance management was 
misconduct.  The Staff Handbook listed dozens of behaviours that could lead to disciplinary 
measures, and reminded employees of their obligation to “familiarise yourself with these 
policies and follow them”, or risk “disciplinary action up to and including dismissal”.  
Finally, performance management was often used to address undesired customer service 
behaviours.  The company had in place a ‘traffic-light system’ which involved rating all store 
employees as being green, amber or red with respect to certain behaviours.  Employees 
classed as amber or red would be put on performance review, and if there was no subsequent 
improvement, disciplinary action could follow. 
Training and development.  The company provided abundant materials—manuals, 
DVDs and online tutorials—on virtually any task to be performed in the stores.  Managers 
were encouraged to identify employees with potential for progression through the annual 
performance appraisal, plan developmental activities for them, and certify the acquisition of a 
skill once it had been demonstrated in practice.  Many developmental activities were ‘on-the-
job’, through informal arrangements such as taking advantage of the need to cover a 
manager’s absence to train a more junior employee in that position: “we don't like to take a 
lot of time to train, we'd rather put people into positions and get them to do it and learn on 
the job, and if they make mistakes, that's fine, we then can learn from those mistakes.” 
(MGR39, Store Manager) 
Promotions.  Promotions were relevant to only a small portion of the company’s 
workforce, since most employees held entry-level positions such as sales consultant or 
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stockroom assistant, and never changed jobs during their time at the company.  For some 
employees, however, having a career in the company was an important component of their 
employment: “you have two lots of people on the shop floor, you have the one person there 
that this is their career, and then you've got the other side of the team where they're here just 
to get paid” (MGR07, Store Manager). 
Promotions were competitive.  All non-entry level vacancies were advertised in a 
company-wide weekly vacancy bulletin, and applicants expected to undergo a formal 
selection process which typically involved an interview with the hiring manager.  
Responsibility for the selection process rested with the hiring manager. Even within a store, 
each manager was encouraged to take responsibility for selecting their team: “I think it is 
important for [my floor managers] to be able to make their own [staffing] decisions, whether 
they be right or wrong, live with them and manage them” (MGR13, Store Manager).  The HR 
department had a general hands-off approach to internal promotion decisions, as this seemed 
to ensure that new appointments were well-suited to the requirements of the store: 
“[managers] know just what the requirements are of their branch, we have to trust them to 
know that, and therefore we give them the power to make that appointment” (HRM5, Head of 
Retail HR).  HR did however occasionally intervene to ensure vacancies were published, and 
that a fair and transparent selection process had been followed. 
Hiring.  Stores were free to conduct their own entry-level recruitment, as long as they 
kept contracted hours within the maximum defined in their structure.  Although a corporate 
jobs website was available, most stores preferred to advertise entry-level vacancies in their 
window, and collect CVs handed to them in-store.  The company ran a highly-popular 
‘friends and family’ program for covering peak-trade staffing needs and this provided stores 
with a valuable pool of tried and tested candidates for permanent positions.  From the point of 
view of HR, one of the reasons to let the stores handle their own recruitment was its own 
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inability to carry it out centrally: “it's a resource issue, because if we were to get involved in 
all the recruiting, then there would need to be a lot of us [HR specialists], and from a cost 
point of view I don't think that would ever be possible” (HRM3, HR Officer). 
In summary, HR decision making processes at the company varied widely in their 
degree of centralisation.  Whereas structure and salary decisions were strongly centralised, 
entry-level hiring was left to the stores to run.  In between, performance management, 
training, and promotions combined deep involvement by line managers with different 
interventions by the HR department.  Respondents put forth several reasons for the different 
degrees of centralisation, including cost control (store structure and pay), local availability of 
best information for decision making (hiring and promotions), need to demonstrate 
consistency in decision making (performance management) and the limited resources of the 
HR department (hiring and performance management). 
Performance pressure 
The way HRM activities were conducted in the stores was influenced by the 
significant pressure for performance exerted on the stores.  Seasonal, monthly and weekly 
commercial targets—total sales, average transaction value and units per transaction—were 
set for each store, broken down by floor, and monitored in real time through the information 
provided by the tills.  Each day in the stores started with a team meeting where the acting 
store manager reviewed the previous day’s figures against weekly targets.  Stores were also 
subject to between one and three ‘mystery shops’ every season to evaluate customer service 
behaviours along strict corporate guidelines.  A significant amount of everyone’s 
compensation (15% to 30% of salary) was paid only if store revenue targets were met and 
mystery-shop results were acceptable.  Stores or floors that did not meet their revenue targets 
could be downgraded and their structure downsized.  Poor mystery-shop results could lead to 
performance management measures, including disciplinary procedures. 
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This tight monitoring system had a profound effect on the way managers engaged in 
HRM activities.  On the one hand, it limited opportunities to make decisions that could 
potentially damage store performance.  For instance, an assistant store manager discussed 
why she would not tolerate informal shift arrangements in her store: 
I have a friend who works in another store, and she'd change hours to suit people, 
and that doesn't end up helping the store, and she does it because she wants to keep 
her staff happy.  But you know, yes, I want to keep my staff happy, but I'm not going to 
do that in detriment of the store, because you end up having to change things anyway 
(MGR14, Assistant Store Manager) 
At the same time, performance pressure encouraged managers to strive for quality in 
carrying out processes in areas such as performance management, promotions, and training: 
If I can get my team trained it will make my job easier [because] if I work with my 
supervisors now, get them trained, they're going to be ready to move into a sales 
management position when that comes up. (MGR31, Sales Manager) 
On the other hand, performance pressures could limit the amount of time dedicated to 
some HRM activities or could delay actions because of the need to find a way not to interfere 
with the running of the store.  For instance, a store manager described how it took longer than 
usual to provide training for an employee because of how difficult it was to arrange time to 
spend with her: 
I’ve had to sit down and think of ways in which we can spend more time with Belinda. 
We were just able to swap Sarah and her around, so Sarah went downstairs and 
Belinda came up.  That's the quietest floor, so now, without being detrimental to the 
store, we can start pulling Belinda off [the shop floor], and she can start training with 
Julie. (MGR43, Store Manager) 
In all, pressure for the stores to deliver sales performance was significant, and this had 
positive and negative effects on how HRM activities were performed by line managers. 
Role of the HR department 
The way the divisional HR department was set up to interact with the stores on a day-
to-day basis was important for how HRM activities were performed in the stores.  The 
department consisted of about 20 people, split into five regional teams each serving one of 
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the division’s commercial regions.  Each regional HR team included an HR manager and two 
or three HR officers and assistants.  Regional HR managers were based in their regions and 
spent up to 4 days a week travelling to visit stores and regional headquarters, while HR 
officers and assistants were based at head office where they staffed a call-centre operation 
supporting the stores via telephone and email.  This setup provided HR with the ability to 
interact with the stores often and to thereby influence and control HRM decision making in 
the stores in different ways.  In some areas of HRM, such as disciplinaries, HR sought a 
stronger hold on decisions, whereas in others they took more of an advisory approach.  For 
instance, one of the HR officers we interviewed provided the following account of her work 
over the phone during disciplinaries: 
The managers will phone: ‘I’m in a disciplinary adjournment.’ So I ensure that they 
are following the policy, and by that I mean I’ll ask them a number of key questions: 
‘have you given notice in writing?’ I will tick, ‘have you used the correct level of 
witnesses?’  I will fill a form in to make sure they've done all of that.  Then I’ll say 
‘tell me what the issue is’, and we go through the details of the case.  My question 
when we've done all of that is ‘what do you want to do?’.  If I think they're way off the 
mark, I will try and pull them towards [my recommended outcome], because I think 
about consistency as a company, I think about the policies that we have and fairness 
and other cases that I know have been similar. (HRM3, HR Officer) 
Conversely, an HR manager described a discussion on a salary decision following a 
promotion in the following terms: 
This morning I’ve had an area manager ring me up and say ‘we're moving this 
manager from here to here, how do you feel about this salary?’ It would be a two-way 
discussion, but fundamentally they are making that decision, I’m just saying 'Yeah, 
that seems fair', or 'No, that doesn't seem fair'. (HRM1, Regional HR Manager) 
These accounts illustrate that, whereas in both cases the HR practitioners saw their 
role as maintaining fairness and consistency, the level of detail to which they would control 
line managers’ actions and decisions varied widely.  In summary, there was continuous 
interaction between the HR department and the stores on a broad range of ongoing HRM 
decisions and issues.  Through those interactions, HR practitioners controlled and influenced 
line managers’ HRM decision making to varying degrees. 
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Role of line managers 
Line managers’ engagement with HRM policies could take three avenues.  First, line 
managers made or proposed decisions within the role formally defined for them in policy.  
For instance, line managers made promotion and hiring decisions, identified talented 
individuals and trained them, proposed merit pay rises and chaired disciplinary proceedings. 
Second, line managers proactively arranged or negotiated outcomes that were not 
explicitly defined in formal policy.  For instance, in disciplinaries, line managers could argue 
for a more lenient or more severe sanction than usually attached to a particular behaviour, and 
were often able to persuade others to accept that outcome.  In the following account, the line 
manager chose to ‘fight that corner’ to take a more lenient approach to an employee’s 
absence than HR would deem appropriate: 
I’ve done a disciplinary for absence where we had a lady who had some difficult 
personal circumstances and they resulted in her being late and unreliable, and when 
we delivered her circumstances to the HR officer they didn't have much sympathy, and 
I had to say ‘Look, I know this person’.  I felt like it was my obligation to fight that 
corner.  And the HR officer eventually came to an agreement about it and gave this 
person an opportunity to improve. (MGR42, Sales Manager) 
Finally, line managers sometimes avoided or found ways around policy controls in 
order to make decisions contrary to policy, behind the backs of the HR department.  For 
instance, one of our interviewees reported that, when HR directed all part time contracts in 
her store to be reduced in hours, she had her contract changed but received assurance from 
her store manager that she would continue to do the same weekly hours as before.  
Respondents from the HR organisation confirmed that such informal arrangements around 
work times were relatively common, despite their efforts at ensuring compliance with staffing 
policy.  As a regional HR manager remarked, “there are managers that if they can get away 
with not doing something they will absolutely try to do that, or if they can find a workaround 
for doing it then they will” (HRM1, Regional HR Manager). 
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In summary, within each area of HRM activity, line managers could decide and 
propose within the prerogatives designed in formal processes; they could ask and negotiate 
with other stakeholders beyond the provisions of policy; and they could avoid or circumvent 
formal policies.  Additional examples of each of these are provided in figure 2. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
DISCUSSION 
The Findings section above has described the various ways in which HRM practices 
were enacted in the case organisation, as a result of variations in the design of decision 
processes, existing performance pressures, and the actions of HR practitioners and line 
managers.  This discussion adopts a managerial discretion theory lens to argue that, as is the 
case for general strategy (Hendry, 2002), line manager discretion is a crucial element in the 
effective implementation of HRM systems.  We develop this insight in three stages.  First, we 
look at how managerial discretion theory helps us to understand line managers’ contribution 
to HR implementation.  Second, we argue that HR specialists are sensitive to the importance 
of such contribution and manage it through the design of formal policies and procedures, and 
their own involvement in day-to-day decision making.  Finally, we discuss the rationales 
behind the varied arrangements that make HR devolution a complex and multifaceted 
phenomenon. 
Line managers and effective HR implementation 
Managerial discretion theory suggests that formal strategies do not wholly determine 
the actions of their implementers, but leave latitude for them to exercise their cognitive and 
political abilities as they go about choosing and executing the courses of action that constitute 
implemented strategy (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987, Hendry, 2002).  Consistent with this 
view, the present study found that line managers engage with HRM policies and procedures 
in three distinct ways: they can decide and propose a decision within the remit of their formal 
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role, they can ask and negotiate an outcome outside of formal policies and procedures, and 
they can avoid and circumvent policies and procedures.  These findings describe a richer and 
more active role for line managers in HR implementation than previous understandings, 
which have focused on whether line managers carry out the activities prescribed in policy, 
and whether, when they do, they “take them seriously” (Guest and Bos-Nehles, 2013:81).   
Moreover, by differentiating the two components of managerial discretion—latitude 
of actions and latitude of objectives (Shen and Cho, 2005)—the theory helps identify where 
line managers are likely to contribute to effective HR implementation.  We propose a 
correspondence between the three ways of engagement with policy and the two components 
of managerial discretion.  In the context of HRM implementation, latitude of objectives—the 
ability of agents to pursue goals that are different from their principals’ (Shen and Cho, 
2005)—would imply line managers making HRM decisions in pursuit of their personal goals 
rather than the organisation’s.  Similar to other researchers before us (e.g. Nadisic, 2008, 
Purcell and Hutchinson, 2007), we found in our study that line managers may avoid 
prescribed HRM action or circumvent policy controls, in order to further goals that contradict 
the aim of policy makers.  For example, we found instances where line managers kept 
informal shift agreements as a way of fostering good personal relationships with employees, 
to the potential detriment of their store’s staffing levels.  Such ‘avoiding and circumventing’ 
activities therefore can be understood as attempts by line managers to carve out spaces for 
latitude of objectives in their enactment of HRM practices. 
On the other hand, latitude of actions—managers’ ability to choose which actions to 
undertake in pursuit of organisational objectives (Shen and Cho, 2005)—would describe a 
line manager who uses HRM procedures along with her problem solving and political 
abilities to make or influence HRM decisions in ways that further the goals of the 
organisation, even if the particular course of action is not part of explicit formal policy.  In 
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our research, latitude of actions describes the many instances where managers used their best 
effort and judgement in making decisions within the normal course of HRM processes—
‘deciding and proposing’—, as well as those where they devised non-standard solutions and 
persuaded others to adopt them—‘asking and negotiating’. 
Thus, whereas previous views emphasised how line managers may detract from the 
effectiveness of HRM systems by ignoring policy or complying with it half-heartedly (Guest 
and Bos-Nehles, 2013)—similar to ‘avoid and circumvent’—our findings bring to the fore 
the importance of ‘deciding and proposing’ and ‘asking and negotiating’ as ways in which 
line managers actively contribute to the effective implementation of HRM systems.  
HR specialists and effective HR implementation 
The present study also sheds light on HR specialists’ role in shaping managerial 
discretion in HRM processes.  According to managerial discretion theory, latitude of actions 
emerges from the interplay between contextual constraints and the cognitive and political 
abilities of managers (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987).  Latitude of objectives, on the other 
hand, is limited by monitoring and control, and the vigilance of significant stakeholders 
(Shen and Cho, 2005).  We therefore argue that line manager discretion in HRM is not a 
feature HR specialists can simply design in policy and procedure, but emerges from the 
interplay between formal processes, performance pressures, and the ongoing actions of HR 
specialists and line managers themselves. More specifically, latitude of action in HRM is 
dependent on the cognitive and political abilities of managers, but also on the design of open 
procedures and the day-to-day engagement of HR specialists to guide, educate and facilitate 
the contribution of line managers. Latitude of objectives in HRM, on the other hand, can be 
curbed through performance pressures, procedural controls, and active monitoring by HR 
specialists.  Thus, besides designing policies and procedures with the intention of affording 
discretion to line managers in particular areas, HR practitioners may also seek to involve 
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themselves in day-to-day decision processes and, through a combination of advice and 
political pressure, have an influence on line managers’ decisions.   
Our study therefore suggests that HR specialists are sensitive and indeed pay keen 
attention to enacted managerial discretion in HRM systems, and that they design and manage 
HRM policies and procedures in ways that afford more or less discretion to line managers in 
different areas, often aiming to curb their latitude of objectives, while facilitating spaces for 
latitude of action.   
Managerial discretion and HR devolution 
The result of HR specialists’ design and management of HRM systems is quite a 
varied set of arrangements for HRM decision-making in terms of the amount of involvement 
of line managers and HR specialists.  At one end of the spectrum, there may be areas of HRM 
activity where HR specialists barely intervene, while at the other there may be areas where 
HR spends considerable amounts of time and effort restricting and shaping line managers’ 
discretion. 
From the point of view of HR specialists, such varied approaches may respond to 
several rationales.  First, HRM practices have important implications for the cost base of 
organisations through their impact on labour costs, and therefore cost-effectiveness is a key 
goal of all HRM systems (Boxall and Purcell, 2016).  Decisions that have a direct bearing on 
labour costs, such as staff numbers and salary levels, are likely to be more centralised, 
especially in those industries and segments where cost containment is an important 
component of a firm’s strategy, as was the case for the retailer we studied.   
Second, decision processes are likely to be more centralised when it is important to be 
able to demonstrate consistency in decision making.  Whereas HRM is contrasted to 
traditional personnel management as favouring flexibility over procedure (Storey, 1992), 
there remain areas of HRM where a strong emphasis on procedural consistency persists 
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because of legal and other institutional constraints (Paauwe and Boselie, 2007).  In our case 
study, for instance, aspects of disciplinary action were centralised with the explicit goal of 
ensuring procedural consistency as protection against claims of unfair treatment.   
Third, decision making is likely to be more decentralised in processes for which local 
dispersed information is valuable for decision making.  Brewster and Larsen (2000) noted 
that one of the reasons for HR devolution was a trend towards integrating HRM decisions 
with other aspects of day-to-day business unit management.  In our case study, local 
information about candidate abilities and specific job requirements was deemed important for 
effective hiring and promotion decisions, so wide discretion was afforded to the line manager 
in these areas.   
Finally, limitations in the resources and size of the HR department mean that some 
resource-intensive activities may be decentralised as a way to limit the overheads of the 
department.  It is often harder for cost-centre functions such as HR to justify large cost 
budgets, than it is for profit-making departments, which means the former may be limited in 
their resources and forced to transfer activities to the latter (Hall and Torrington, 1998).  In 
our case study, the HR department did not have the capacity to intervene in entry-level hiring 
across the store network, so this activity was left to line managers.   
Whereas these rationales have been identified in previous literature as reasons for, or 
barriers against HR devolution (Brewster and Larsen, 2000, Hall and Torrington, 1998), our 
analysis advances this knowledge by showing that multiple centralising and decentralising 
rationales can impinge on different aspects of a single HRM system at the same time, thus 
providing a view of HR devolution as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. 
LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The present study has limitations and therefore its findings should be taken with 
caution.  First, the main data source is interview data, which has been found to be susceptible 
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to bias induced by retrospective sensemaking (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  We believe, 
however, that this problem is at least partially mitigated in the present study by our focus on 
eliciting detailed participant narratives of recent and on-going episodes of HRM activities 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  Second, whereas a single case study approach facilitated a 
rich investigation of HRM activities in one organisational context, the theory we have derived 
from this investigation may be limited in its generality (Langley, 1999).  Specifically, the 
question arises about the extent to which the findings may be idiosyncratic of the organisation 
studied, its industry or its national setting.  Further case studies of other organisations, in 
different industries and countries are needed, which may amend or extend the theory 
proposed here. 
Implications for HRM theory and research 
Notwithstanding its limitations, the present study makes several contributions to 
HRM scholarship.  Foremost, it provides a more fine-grained understanding of HRM decision 
making processes and of the roles of line managers and HR practitioners in them.  Most 
previous research on HR devolution has examined the allocation of HRM tasks and 
responsibilities between HR practitioners and line managers (e.g. Brewster et al., 2015, 
Reichel and Lazarova, 2013).  Our study, however, joins Jones and Saundry (2012), and 
McDermott et al. (2015) in highlighting the limitations of binary conceptualisations of HR 
devolution as an allocation of responsibilities to either the line or HR.  As our detailed 
description of HRM processes at the case organisation shows, there are multiple, sometimes 
subtle and surprising, ways in which both line managers and HR practitioners can involve 
themselves in HRM decision making, so that most areas of HRM seem to combine and 
juxtapose devolved and non-devolved elements.  Moreover, the influence that HR or the line 
have on the outcomes of HRM decisions depends not only on the design of formal processes, 
but also on the ongoing interactions among the different actors, which may limit or expand 
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managerial discretion in different ways over time.  Our findings thus illustrate the complexity 
and fluidity of actual HRM decision making processes, which render binary distinctions 
based on the design of formal processes problematic.   
Secondly, where the literature has often emphasised line managers’ negative impact 
on HRM practices through the introduction of distortion and variability (Wright and Nishii, 
2013), our results suggest that the effective implementation of HRM systems may depend on 
the extent to which managers’ cognitive and political abilities are mobilised to bring about 
decisions that are well suited to the local situations that line managers know best.  For 
instance, the success of a new performance appraisal system may depend on managers’ 
abilities being engaged to distinguish desired from undesired behaviours, and to persuade 
others of the validity of such assessments.  Thus, we draw attention to the positive 
contribution to effective HR implementation by line managers who deploy their cognitive and 
political abilities to help make HRM systems work in practice.   
Implications for HRM practice 
Two recommendations to HR practitioners follow from the above.  First, HRM 
processes should be designed to allow for areas where line managers are encouraged and 
supported to exercise their cognitive and political abilities and maximise their contribution to 
local problem solving.  Whereas under current thinking, HR practitioners are advised to be 
vigilant of the ways in which managers might shirk and deviate from prescribed practice, our 
perspective suggests they should also be sensitive to how line managers can contribute to the 
success of HRM systems, and aim to optimise such contributions.  
Second, our research suggests that designing HRM processes may not be sufficient, 
and points to the value of HR practitioners’ engagement in day-to-day HRM decision making 
as a way to shape managers’ discretion.  Past advice to practitioners has encouraged a hands-
off, arms-length approach where HR practitioners would mostly concern themselves with 
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policy design and some overall quality assurance (Guest and Bos-Nehles, 2013) but would 
eschew involvement in day-to-day tasks regarded as ‘non-strategic’ or ‘administrative’ 
(Boudreau and Lawler, 2012).  Our research however goes contrary to blanket calls for 
practitioners to abandon such activities, and suggests that their involvement in day-to-day 
HRM can be critical to effective HR implementation through fostering, shaping and 
controlling the discretion of line managers. 
Our suggestion therefore is that intense day-to-day interaction with line managers, 
along with well-defined spaces for managerial discretion in HRM processes, may be key to 
ensuring the effective implementation of HRM systems.  
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Figure 1: Design of HRM decision-making processes 
 Area of HRM  Decision making process 
Centralised 
Store structure  
All positions, hours and shifts set centrally, but store managers 
need to achieve it locally: consultations, hiring, contracts, hours, 
etc. Man-hours adjusted locally according to productivity 
formula. 
 
Salary and bonus 
All salary bands set centrally by job grade.  Annual cost-of-
living increases.  Manager can propose for additional merit 
increase, although highly restrictive.  On promotion, unwritten 
rule to move salary ‘one grade up, one step back’.  Monthly and 
seasonal bonus calculated centrally according to store revenue 
goal attainment and individual’s hours worked. 
 
Performance 
management 
Absence and lateness trigger points, and seasonal customer 
service appraisals prompt performance management action. 
Pre-disciplinary: guidelines for corrective coaching and formal 
counselling.  Application is local, subject to audits. 
Disciplinary: strict formal requirements, decision is manager’s 
in consultation with HR. 
 
Training and 
development  
Abundant printed and on-line materials for self study; individual 
development goals and actions planned and executed locally 
through absence covers and delegation. 
 
Promotions 
Decision is hiring manager’s, who manages internal selection 
process.  All vacancies published in bulletin, model interview 
questions. 
Decentralised 
Hiring 
Stores do their own hiring for entry-level positions within their 
store structure budget: set contract hours, advertise in shop 
window, collect CVs, interviews, etc. 
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Figure 2: Role of line managers in HRM decision-making processes 
 Decide and propose Ask and negotiate Avoid and circumvent 
Store structure None 
Negotiate changes to 
standard structure 
Informal shift 
arrangements 
Salary and bonus 
Propose for merit 
increase 
Negotiate higher salary 
on promotion 
None 
Performance 
management 
Carry out investigation 
and disciplinary hearing.  
Make decision ‘together’ 
with HR 
Negotiate lesser sanction 
Ask for changes to 
absence trigger points 
Failure to act on 
misconduct 
Training and 
development 
Plan training activities  
Program absence covers 
Arrange developmental 
job assignments in other 
stores or head office   
Failure to develop 
employees 
Promotions 
Decision to appoint 
Negotiate direct 
appointment (without 
publication in bulletin) 
Inquire  about potential 
candidates 
Failure to provide 
feedback to candidates 
Hiring Decision to hire None None 
 
 
